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WAGE DISCRIMINATION AND JOB 
SEGREGATION: THE SURVIVAL OF 
A THEORY 
Ruth G. Blumrosen* 
My earlier article in this journal, Wage Discrimination, Job 
Segregation, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, ad-
vanced the theory that the same discriminatory factors which 
lead to job segregation are also likely to be responsible for wage 
differentials between segregated jobs. 1 The discriminatorily de-
pressed wage rate of the segregated job is therefore one of the 
"adverse effects" under Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 2 of job segre-
gation. In order to establish a prima facie case of wage discrimi-
nation in a Title VII action, plaintiffs must show the fact of job 
segregation - that the jobs were identified as minority or fe-
male - and that the wages in the segregated jobs occupied the 
low end of the employer's wage scale. 
In a subsequent issue of this journal, Messrs. Nelson, Opton, 
and Wilson challenged both the factual and legal premises of my 
thesis. 8 In this article I address only the main points of their 
critique; the reader, however, should not assume that my silence 
indicates acquiescence on any point made by them. 
• Associate Professor, Graduate School of Management, Rutgers University; B.A., 
J.D., University of Michigan; Consultant, Health and Human Services, present; Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission, 1965, 1979-80; Assistant to the Dean, Howard 
Law School, 1966-67; Advisor to governmental and private parties on equal employment 
and equal housing opportunities since 1960. The views expressed herein are those of the 
author and should no~ be attributed to any government agency. 
' Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation, and Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 397 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Wage 
Discrimination.]. 
• 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See generally A. ScHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT D1sCRIMI-
NATION LAW 1-25, 65-181 (1976); Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke 
Power Co. and the Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REV. 59, 66-71 
(1972); Int'! Bhd. of Teamsters v. U.S., 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). See also Wage 
Discrimination, supra note 1, at 290 n.222. 
• Nelson, Opton & Wilson, Wage Discrimination and the "Comparable Worth" The-
ory in Perspective, 13 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 233 (1980) [hereinafter referred to as Nelson et 
al. and cited as Comparable Worth). 
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I. POINTS OF REBUTTAL 
A. Congressional Intent and the "Plain Meaning" of the 
Title VII Language 
Nelson et al. argue that Congress did not intend to address 
wage discrimination resulting from job segregation.' This argu-
ment simply disregards the language of Title VII. In their Intro-
duction, the authors quote Section 703 (a)(l) of Title VII in crit-
icizing the statutory basis of my theory. Nowhere, however, do 
they quote Section 703 (a)(2), which makes it unlawful for an 
employer: 
[t]o limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way 
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of 
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect 
his status as an employee, because of such individual's 
race, color, religion, sex or national origin. 0 
The breadth of the statutory language makes clear that ·con-
gress intended to address all consequences of job segregation, 
including an effect which segregation might have on wages. My 
argument states that where job segregation is established, a dis-
criminatorily depressed wage in the segregated job will generally 
constitute an "adverse effect" of segregation. Assuming the 
validity of the evidence in support of this proposition, 6 then dis-
criminatorily depressed wages seem clearly within the plain 
meaning of "adverse effect" under Section 703 (a)(2). Even a 
Title VII linguistic purist such as Justice Rehnquist would 
agree.7 
B. Precision in Measuring Discrimination 
Messrs. Nelson, Opton, and Wilson, after a thorough review of 
the economic, social, and legal materials, conclude that my the-
ory is flawed essentially because the extent of wage discrimina-
• Comparable Worth, supra note 3, at 265-67. 
• Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(a)(2), 78 Stat. 253 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. §2000(e)-2(a)(2) (1976)). 
• Nelson et al. never explicitly deny the validity of the evidence presented in Wage 
Discrimination, but point to other evidence to support their position. See Comparable 
Worth, supra note 3, at 260-63. 
• See Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977). 
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tion in any given setting cannot be measured with prec1s1on. 
They do not deny that wage discrimination may exist to a signif-
icant degree; they argue, rather, that it cannot be measured pre-
cisely because no abstract yardstick is available to compare the 
"worth" of one job with the "worth" of another. That being the 
case, they argue, it is improper to infer that there is any wage 
discrimination arising out of the fact that jobs reserved for mi-
norities or women are paid less than jobs reserved for whites or 
males.8 
But these arguments attack a strawperson. My theory 'does 
not depend on an abstract yardstick for measuring the relative 
worth of jobs. In fact my theory is based on the opposite pro-
position: that relative wage rates are the result of conventions 
and traditions which cannot be derived in any scientific way. 
Nelson et al. 's lack-of-an-objective-yardstick criticism stems 
from their insistence on labeling my theory of wage discrimina-
tion "comparable worth." There are those who propound theo-
ries of equal pay for work of comparable value, calling for wage 
rate determinations based on the intrinsic value of the work per-
formed rather than the prevailing discriminatory wages paid in 
the labor market. These theorists propose that job evaluation 
methodology be used to measure the relative "intrinsic" values 
of work performed, substituting the plaintiff's (or the govern-
ment's) yardstick for the one chosen by the employer.9 Nelson et 
al. 's claims that a prohibition on wage discrimination would lead 
to government wage fixing and the death of collective bargaining 
is based on opposition to these "comparable worth" theories -
not opposition to my theory. Their objections have little rele-, 
vance to a theory of wage discrimination such as mine, which 
• Comparable Worth, supra note 3, at 238-40. At bottom, their argument that the 
evidence is not sufficiently creditable simply restates arguments that were anticipated 
and answered in my article. See Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 465-74 . 
• See, e.g., U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, HEARINGS BEFORE THE 
UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION ON Joe SEGREGATION AND 
WAGE D1scRIMINATION 836-39 (1980) (testimony of Hilda Curran) [hereinafter cited as 
EEOC HEARINGS]. See also EEOC notice which postponed the above hearing from Feb-
ruary to April, 1980. The notice specifically divorced questions of wage discrimination in 
segregated jobs from the theory of comparable worth, i.e., "that the government should 
adopt or administer an abstract standard to determine job worth." 45 Fed. Reg. 11659 
(1980). As EEOC Chairwoman Eleanor Holmes Norton stated, 
Even the language of comparable worth misapprehends and miscommunicates 
the issue, as one which simply seek [sic] to close the wage gap by revaluing 
mainly men [sic] and women's jobs in the workplace. We believe these Hearings 
can help to better educate the public concerning the more limited goal of elimi-
nating discrimination from wage setting that circumscribes the Commission's 
purposes. 
EEOC HEARINGS, supra, at 6. 
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does not rely on an objective wage "yardstick" at any point. My 
theory begins with the "objective" fact of job segregation. 
Messrs. Nelson, Opton, and Wilson essentially argue that the 
central proposition of my thesis - that the same denigrating 
perceptions which lead initially to job segregation generally in-
fluence the pay rate of those jobs - is inexact, and therefore 
cannot be the basis of an inference of discrimination.10 This ar-
gument has been repeatedly rejected by the courts in discrimi-
nation cases. The United States Supreme Court has stated that 
precision in the evidence used is not required to establish dis-
crimination, only that it be sufficiently strong to support an in-
ference which the employer must address. 11 Even in cases based 
on a disparate treatment theory, in which proof of motive, not 
merely adverse effect, is essential to the plaintiff's prima facie 
case, the Court has held that plaintiff need not point to specific 
employment practices nor establish the amount of damages in 
order to make a prima facie case. 12 
C. The Distinction Between Establishing Liability 
and Shaping a Remedy 
The argument by Nelson et al. that the plaintiffs must prove 
the exact extent of wage discrimination also ignores the differ-
ence between establishing liability and shaping a remedy under 
Title VII. "How much" is a question of remedy, not one of lia-
bility.18 Courts have repeatedly stated that the precise extent of 
discrimination need not be established under Title VII when the 
effects on minorities and women are apparent .... 
Problems with Nelson et al. 's approach persist, however, when 
the discussion focuses on remedy alone. The central difference 
1° Comparable Worth, supra note 3, at 244-63. 
11 New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979). 
11 lnt'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). Nelson et al. tend to 
use the words "discriminate" or "segregate" as if the statutory language required a show-
ing of animus or evil motive. However, all members of the U.S. Supreme Court agree 
that motive is not required by 703(a)(2). Nashville Gas v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977). It is 
important when weighing Nelson et al.'s arguments to remember that "Congress directed 
the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment practices." Griggs v. Duke 
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (emphasis added). 
11 See Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 468, 490; Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. U.S., 
431 U.S. 324 (1977); Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 
1974). 
" Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974) (difficulty of 
ascertainment is no longer confused with right of recovery); Rowe v. General Motors 
Corp., 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 
652 (2d Cir. 1971). See also Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 490, 495. 
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between my approach and theirs is that I believe Congress in-
tended to provide a full panoply of remedies for discrimination 
stemming from job segregation; Nelson et al. would have Con-
gress withhold one class of remedies - those affecting wage-set-
ting. Messrs. Nelson, Opton, and Wilson insist that while Con-
gress did intend to interfere with the operation of the law of 
supply and demand in terms of recruiting, selection, hiring, as-
signing, promoting, and fringe benefits, Congress did not intend 
to interfere with respect to wage-setting. Affecting wage-setting, 
however, is no more and no less an interference with market 
forces than regulating recruitment, selection, or other employ-
ment practices; Remedies designed to affect wage-setting are 
simply another way of reaching the objective Congress specified. 
To exclude only the wage setting process from judicial action is 
indeed to set up a strange dichotomy. 
D. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Justify an Inference of 
Discrimination 
Messrs. Nelson, Opton, and Wilson argue that there is insuffi-
cient evidence to warrant an inference of discrimination from 
the fact of law paid segregated jobs. My critics, however, assume 
such discrimination throughout their article. In their argument 
that depressed wages due to segregation will be cured by elimi-
nating segregation,111 Nelson et al. clearly recognize the existence 
of wage discrimination. Throughout their article, the authors im-
plicitly acknowledge the substantial presence of residual dis-
crimination in the wage-setting process. 16 
Similarly, courts often underscore the existence of wage dis-
crimination while denying relief in the particular case. In Chris-
tensen v. lowa17 and Lemons v. City and County of Denver, 18 
for example, both courts rejected comparable worth-style theo-
ries, but did so not because they believed discrimination did not 
exist, but because they thought there was too much discrimina-
tion. Both courts recognized the persistent and pervasive nature 
of discrimination against women manifested in the market rate 
for women's jobs, but did not believe that Congress ·had in-
tended to "abrogate the laws of supply and demand."19 By 
•• Comparable Worth, supra note 3, at 297-98. 
•• See, e.g., Comparable Worth, supra note 3, at 238-39, 264-65. 
11 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977). 
•• 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir. 1980). 
11 Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353, 356 (8th Cir. 1977). 
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pointing to the widespread effects of granting relief, the Chris-
tensen and Lemons courts - as well as Messrs. Nelson, Opton, 
and Wilson - implicitly acknowledge the pervasiveness of the 
discrimination. 
E. "lrrebuttable Presumption" or Merely Shifting 
the Burden of Proof? 
Nelson et al. argue that my thesis creates an irrebuttable pre-
sumption of discrimination. This analysis, however, confuses two 
meanings of the word "irrebutable." The presumption of wage 
discrimination may not be rebuttable because the presumed fact 
exists as a matter of fact. The presumption in such a case is 
"irrebuttable" because there has been discrimination in the 
wage-setting process. The presumption, however, is not irrebut-
table in the legal sense. It is fully possible under my theory for 
an employer to show that sex or race were not factors in the 
employment decisions leading to the pay schedules.20 Moreover, 
the employer does not have to "prove a negative" in order to 
rebut the presumption, as Nelson et al. claim. The burden on 
the employer is a positive one: to show that legitimate, race-neu-
tral and sex-neutral factors account for the wage differential. In-
deed, Congress in the Equal Pay Act, and therefore by the Ben-
nett Amendment in Title VII, has laid precisely that burden on 
employers. 21 
•• Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 488. See also Furnco Constr. Corp. v. 
Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). 
"' See Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974). Senator McNamara, 
Chairman of the Committee which reported the Equal Pay Act, stated, 
There is no question that under the Fair Labor Standards Act the Secretary 
must show that an employer has violated the act, and the same will hold true for 
the enforcement of the new equal pay provision . . .. The employer's defense, if 
it is based on an employer's plan (referring to job evaluations) must be a bona 
fide one; and the burden of demonstrating the legitimacy of that defense will 
rest upon the employer. 
109 CONG. REc. 9219-20 (1963) (remarks of Sen. McNamara). See also Gunther v. Co. of 
Washington, 623 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1980), where the Ninth Circuit said one of the sig-
nificant functions of the Bennett Amendment was to clarify the burden of proof to make 
clear that the allocation of affirmative defenses to the employer would continue into 
Title VII. A cautionary note: the language of the Ninth Circuit is unclear. There are two 
possible interpretations of the court's understanding of the Bennett Amendment. (1) 
The Bennett Amendment operates only when plaintiff claims an Equal Pay-type claim 
under Title VII. Then, the Bennett Amendment would allow the employer to raise EPA 
defenses even though the claim had been brought under Title VII. Unless an Equal Pay 
case were argued, however, the Bennett Amendment would simply not apply. (2) The 
Bennett Amendment operates to allow employers to raise EPA defenses against all wage 
and compensation claims brought under Title VII, even ones that could not have been 
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What my theory does is not to establish an ironclad presump-
tion, but merely to shift the burden of proof. As Nelson et al. 
admit, some portion of the low wages associated with jobs iden-
tified as minority-work or women's-work is probably due to dis-
criminatory wage setting, though some portion may also be due 
to other discriminatory employment practices such as hiring, 
assignment, lack of mobility, etc. Therefore, where an employer 
still maintains low paid, segregated jobs or segregated pay classi-
fications, it is appropriate that the employer - who best knows 
which practices resulted in low pay for these groups - explain 
or justify them. 22 If an unexplained differential that cannot be 
explained by factors other than race, sex, or national origin then 
persists, it is appropriate that certain risks be born by the em-
ployer: i.e., the risk of imprecise injury measurement, and the 
risk that some injuries are attributable to discriminatory em-
ployment practices other than wage discrimination. The em-
ployer not only created the wage-setting system, but is in a bet-
ter position to obtain key information and to make needed 
changes.23 
Such changes may well include not only modification of the 
wage-setting process, but redesign of jobs previously assigned to 
women or minorities. To eliminate job segregation requires fun-
nelling men and whites into previously segregated jobs as much 
as opening white male jobs to women and minorities. As dis-
cussed in my earlier article, the litmus test for the end of dis-
crimination in segregated jobs is when the jobs can attract and 
retain white men in sufficient numbers to overcome the former 
stigma and identification. 
F. Economic and Social Costs in Implementing the 
Blumrosen Theory 
Finally, Messrs. Nelson, Opton and Wilson raise the specter of 
total disruption of the industrial relations system should my 
entertained under EPA. The Supreme Court in Manhart indicated that in its opinion 
the latter is the correct interpretation. See Los Angeles Department of Water & Power v. 
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 712 n.23 (1978), where the Court said, "We need not decide 
whether retirement benefits or contributions to benefit plans are 'wages' under the Act, 
because the Bennett Amendment extends the Act's four exceptions to all forms of 'com-
pensation' covered by Title VII." If the Bennett Amendment is construed to extend the 
affirmative defenses to all compensation claims based on sex - even those not cogniza-
ble under the EPA - the clarification of the burden of proof which the Ninth Circuit 
found 'significant' is more needed than if it applies only to equal pay cases in Title VII . 
.. See Int'! Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 359-60 (1977) . 
.. Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 495. 
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theory prevail. This disregards both the good sense of the fed-
eral district courts and the adaptability of the American indus-
trial relations system. If the law requires reexamination of wage 
systems which evolved under conditions of discrimination, in-
dustry will react without falling into chaos, as it has in reexam-
ining hiring and promotion criteria. I agree that the task of the 
judges in the first few cases in shaping remedies will be difficult, 
but they competently faced that task before, during the early 
development of Title VII law. If industry does not like the ap-
proach which the courts evolve, they can substitute their own. 
Difficulties in shaping a remedy are simply not grounds for 
denying relief under Title VII. 
II. NEW DEVELOPMENTS: WAGE DISCRIMINATION BEYOND THE 
SCOPE OF THE EQUAL PA y ACT 
A. Court Decisions 
In the year since Wage Discrimination appeared, courts and 
administrative agencies have begun to develop and apply prin-
ciples of discrimination law to the wage-setting process. The Su-
preme Court has agreed to review the decision in Gunther v. 
County of Washington14 which raises sharply and clearly the 
question of whether the Bennett Amendment precludes consid-
eration of sex-based wage discrimination claims under Title VII 
which· are not cognizable under the Equal Pay Act.211 The issue 
should be resolved this year. Moreover, in the interim since pub-
14 623 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3322 (Nov. 3, 1980) . 
.. In Gunther, jail matrons sued the County of Washington on two counts. They 
claimed that their work was equal to that of the male jail guards, so that paying them 
less was a violation of EPA; but that even if their work was not "equal," they were paid 
less than could be accounted for by the work differential, and that part of the difference 
was due to sex discrimination. The district court found that the jobs were not equal and 
dismissed the complaint, citing the Bennett Amendment. The Ninth Circuit reversed, 
holding that a plaintiff is not precluded from establishing sex-based wage discrimination 
under some other theory compatible with Title VII. Gunther, 623 F.2d at 1317. Rehear-
ing was then requested on the grounds that the Bennett Amendment argument had not 
been clearly argued and considered. The court, in an exhaustive opinion, denied rehear-
ing, carefully restricting its holding solely to the Bennett Amendment issue. The opinion 
stressed that the record was unclear as to what alternative claims plaintiffs might pre-
sent to establish a Title VII claim. However, in dicta, the court did indicate that al-
though comparisons of jobs might be relevant to "some other Title VII theory," the the-
ory of comparable worth alone was not sufficient so the plaintiff "could not establish a 
Title VII prims facie case based solely on a comparison of the work she performed," 
unless the work met EPA standards of equality. 
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lication of Wage Discrimination, four Courts of Appeal have 
held that the Bennett Amendment does not preclude considera-
tion of wage discrimination claims which are beyond the EPA. 16 
These courts have maintained that the Bennett Amendment 
merely incorporates the four exceptions of the EPA into Title 
VII as affirmative defenses . 
.. See Gunther v. County of Washington, 623 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 
49 U.S.L.W. 3322 (Nov. 3, 1980); JUE v. Westinghouse, (1980) LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) (23 
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.) 588 (3d Cir. 1980); EEOC v. Aetna Insurance Co., 616 F.2d 719 
(4th Cir. 1980); Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade, Inc., 624 F.2d 945 (10th Cir. 1980). 
Despite these courts' agreement with my position, Nelson et al. argue that my argu-
ment to this effect is "unpersuasive." Comparable Worth, supra note 3, at 271. Their 
position, and that taken by several courts, can be responded to in several ways. First, in 
Orr v. Frank R. MacNeill & Son, Inc., 511 F.2d 166 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 865 
(1975) - a case usually cited for the proposition that the Bennett Amendment requires 
plaintiffs to make an Equal Pay case to prevail under Title VII - the plaintiff never 
proved the intentional discrimination she had alleged. Secondly, it has generally been 
overlooked that both Orr and a similarly cited case, Ammons v. Zia, 448 F.2d 117 (10th 
Cir. 1971), were both Equal Pay Act cases. They were brought for pre-1972 wages, by 
employees "exempt" under FLSA and therefore also not covered by EPA, at that time. 
It has now been all but forgotten but whether such employees were also excluded from 
Title VII coverage had been the major early battle over the Bennett Amendment. It was 
to establish broader coverage under Title VII that the original EEOC general counsel 
letter of 1966 was drafted, 129 C.F.R. 1604.7 (1965). Contrary to Nelson et al.'s assertion 
that the EEOC intended to restrict Title VII substantively, coverage was the problem 
the EEOC was addressing. After publication of the letter, the Bennett Amendment was 
understood not to restrict coverage so that persons like Orr and Ammons, not eligible 
under Equal Pay Act, could, and did, bring Equal Pay-type actions under Title VII. It is 
in this context that the restrictive language of those cases should be understood. Senator 
Bennett tried a year later to explain that coverage restriction was the intended objective 
of his amendment. See 111 CONG. REc. 13359 (1965). Nelson et al. quote Bennett's con-
clusion that "discrimination ... does not violate Title VII unless it also violates the 
Equal Pay Act," Comparable Worth, supra note 3, at 272, but does not mention that 
this statement referred only to the coverage controversy and to the four exceptions. Iron--
ically, had Senator Bennett's explanation been accepted, the Bennett Amendment would 
today be a dead letter, since in 1972 Congress extended coverage of the Equal Pay Act to 
"exempt" employees. 
One district court, in Gerlach v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., (1980) LAB. REL. REP. 
(BNA) (24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.) 69 (Sept. 15) has concluded that the Bennett Amend-
ment restricts Title VII to intentional wage discrimination claims. The Court's analysis, 
however, hinged on the fact that the first sentence of Section 703(h) has been interpreted 
to require intentional discrimination. From this Judge Boyle concluded that the limita-
tion of intentional discrimination applied to all of 703(h). This is simply wrong. The 
Court overlooks the second sentence of Section 703(h), the Tower Amendment, which is 
the source of the Griggs principle that employment tests must be job-related. Thus, the 
Tower Amendment - which requires tests to be job related - and the Bennett Amend-
ment - which brings over the EPA defenses allowing job-related evaluation systems 
based on factors other than sex - are clearly analogous. Both were intended to recognize 
and protect legitimate employer interests in the use of tests, job evaluation systems and 
other recognized "wage conditions" which were not based on race or sex. Both were in-
tended to do so by requiring the employer to show job relatedness. Bennett's Amend-
ment should therefore be interpreted in the same way as Tower's - not limited by the 
first sentence of 703(h). 
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The Courts have also begun to come to grips with the question 
of how wage discrimination may be established once the thresh-
old Bennett Amendment issue is put to rest. These decisions 
have held that: 
(1) Perpetuation of deliberate wage discrimination based on 
sex is present discrimination;17 
(2) A disproportionately large salary differential not accounted 
for by differences in work done by a man and a woman is per-
missible evidence of intentional sex discrimination;28 
(3) Proof of wage differentials between different jobs based on 
plaintiff's job evaluation, without more, will not establish a 
prima facie case of wage discrimination under Title VIl;29 and 
•• In IUE v. Westinghouse, [1980] LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) (23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.) 
588 (3d Cir. 1980), plaintiffs alleged that Westinghouse had in 1939 adopted a policy 
overtly paying women's jobs less than men's jobs with the same job score. The union 
furthermore alleged that despite changes over the intervening years, the jobs were still 
predominantly male or female, and that current pay scales could be traced directly to 
that overt discrimination. 
18 See Gunther v. County of Washington, 623 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1980); Fitzgerald v. 
Sirloin Stockade, Inc., 624 F.2d 945 (10th Cir. 1980). In Sirloin Stockade the lower court 
had found, as part of a general pattern of sex discrimination, that although plaintiff had 
performed a substantial part of the duties of advertising manager, she had not been 
given a salary that reflected her responsibilities. 
19 Cf. Lemons v. City and County of Denver, 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir. 1980). Lemons, 
however, presents a slightly complex situation. In Lemons, the Tenth Circuit summed up 
the case as "based on the proposition that nurses are underpaid in City positions, and in 
the community, in comparison with other and different jobs which they assert are of 
equal worth to the employer." Lemons, 620 F.2d at 220. Having so characterized the 
claim, the court then analogized Lemons to Christensen v. State of Iowa, 563 F.2d 353 
(8th Cir. 1977) saying that the disparity shown by such comparisons "was not sought to 
be adjusted by the Civil Rights Act," evidently because, quoting Christensen, "We do 
not interpret Title VII as requiring an employer to ignore the market in setting wage 
rates for genuinely different work classifications." The Court in Lemons then relied, 
without further analysis, on Ammons v. Zia Co., 448 F.2d 117 (10th Cir. 1971) for the 
proposition that "the Bennett Amendment is generally considered to have the equal pay/ 
equal work concept apply to Title VII in the same way it applies to the Equal Pay Act 
.... Moreover, to establish a case under Title VII, one must prove a differential in pay 
based on sex for performing equal work." 
Despite this seemingly definitive language, the Tenth Circuit probably does not really 
mean what it says in Lemons. Less than a month before the decision, the Tenth Circuit 
decided another case, Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade, Inc., 624 F.2d 945 (10th Cir. 1980), 
in which the court allowed a cause of action of discrimination in compensation based on 
sex under Title VII, saying: 
The purpose of the Bennett Amendment, is to bring Title VII into accord with 
the Equal Pay Act. Thus the exceptions provided in the Equal Pay Act, such as 
pay differentials due to a seniority or merit system, or other valid factors not 
based on sex, are also exceptions under Title VII. 
On the employer argument that Title VII claims of sex-based discrimination were con-
trolled by the standards of the EPA, the Court stated: "Here a finding of discrimination 
under Title VII does not conflict with the provisions of the Equal Pay Act. It was found 
that the plaintiff was discriminated against solely because of her sex in a manner which 
is not within the scope of the Equal Pay Act. This finding does not offend the Bennett 
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(4) Proof of segregated jobs and deliberate wage classifications 
which resulted in low pay will show illegal discrimination. 30 
In determining what theories might be within the parameters 
of Title VII, the courts so far have had no occasion to go beyond 
determining whether Title VII reaches at least some forms of 
intentional discrimination. Besides two "comparable worth 
cases" claiming discrimination in compensation under Section 
703(a)(l),31 plaintiffs have for the most part so far only claimed 
intentional discrimination. However, the Third Circuit has also 
suggested that Title VII has as broad a coverage on sex discrimi-
nation as it does in any other case: that is, other than the four 
exceptions of the EPA, "there is no dilution of sex discrimina-
tion coverage in Title VII cases. "31 This seems consonant with 
the Supreme Court position on the order and nature of proof of 
Title VII claims. 33 
This set of decisions properly leaves the district courts free to 
evaluate various forms of proof against the mandate of the stat-
ute. A definitive judicial assessment of the proof process in wage 
discrimination cases must await the course of litigation. This is 
as it should be. My theory of wage discrimination resulting from 
job segregation, as well as other theories will, after Gunther, be 
tested in the crucible of concrete litigation. 
B. Administrative Developments: EEOC Hearings on Wage 
Discrimination 
Administrative agencies have been moving ahead vigorously in 
the wage discrimination area. In April, 1980, the EEOC held a 
three day public hearing in Washington, D.C., on Job Segrega-
Amendment and Equal Pay Act standards should not be controlling." Sirloin Stockade, 
624 F.2d at 953 n.2 (emphasis added). 
•• See IUE v. Westinghouse, [1980) LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) (23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.) 
588, 590 (3d Cir. 1980) ("Westinghouse allegedly used a system which set the wage rates 
lower for any classification if the group covered within that category was predominately 
female .... We hold that this alleged intentional discrimination in formulating classifi• 
cations of jobs violates Title VII .... "); Gerlach v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., [1980) 
LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) (24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.) 69 (Sept. 15) (Company allegedly clas• 
sified new job as clerical resulting in sex-segregated job and low pay). 
" Lemons v. City and County of Denver, 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir. 1980); Gerlach v. 
Michigan Bell Telephone Co., [1980) LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) (24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.) 69 
(Sept. 15). 
'" IUE v. Westinghouse, [1980) LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) (23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.) 588, 
593 (3d Cir. 1980) . 
.. See Los Angeles Water Board v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978); Dothard v. Rawlin-
son, 433 U.S. 321 (1977). See also Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 459. 
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tion and Wage Discrimination. 84 The purpose of the hearing was 
to gather the facts necessary to identify the extent of depressed 
wages in jobs held by minorities and women and to determine if 
these depressed wages were, in fact, the result of forces which 
include discrimination. 811 These were the first hearings ever con-
ducted by a government agency on the links between occupa-
tional segregation and wage discrimination. According to EEOC 
Chairwoman Norton, "these are the most important Hearings 
this Commission has had in a decade. "88 
In the hearing, fifty-six witnesses from the private sector, in-
terest groups, academicians, compensation specialists, and indi-
vidual citizens presented almost a thousand pages of oral testi-
mony. An overwhelming proportion of the testimony supported 
the central factual assertion of my theory - that wage depres-
sion generally accompanies job segregation.87 Even if the Com-
mission does no more 'than it has already done in publishing the 
record, the compiliation of so much material focused on wage 
discrimination will be a useful source for judges and scholars 
alike. 
The hearing, moreover, was only part of the EEOC's three-
pronged approach to the issue of wage discrimination in segre-
gated jobs. The EEOC in July, 1979, became responsible for en-
forcement of the Equal Pay Act, pursuant to President Carter's 
first Reorganization Plan, and became the lead agency charged 
with the development of a "uniform and harmonious body of law 
concerning employment discrimination. " 88 In exercise of this re-
sponsibility, the EEOC has, in addition to the hearings, commis-
sioned a study of job evaluation from the prestigious National 
Academy of Sciences,89 and intervened into recent court cases to 
obtain legal clarification on jurisdictional and other primary 
issues. 
Other agencies have gotten involved, as well. The Department 
of Labor, which enforces the Executive Branch program prohib-
iting employment discrimination by government contractors, 
also is focusing on wage discrimination. The Department is in 
the process of toughening its enforcement efforts, according to 
Assistant Secretary of Labor Donald Elisburg, modifying the 
14 EEOC HEARINGS, supra note 9. 
•• 44 Fed. Reg. 63485 (1979) (first notice of EEOC job segregation hearings). See also 
EEOC HEARINGS, supra note 9, at 4. 
" EEOC HEARINGS, supra note 9, at 4. 
17 See generally EEOC HEARINGS, supra note 9, at 10-668. 
aa See 1978 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 802. 
•• EEOC HEARINGS, supra note 9, at 3. 
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OFCCP regulations, and encouraging routine investigations for 
wage discrimination based on job segregation by sex. As secre-
tary Elisburg has testified: 
Executive Order 11246 was amended in 1968 to extend 
its coverage to sex discrimination. It is clear to those of 
us who have dealt with the issue of sex-based wage dis-
crimination and job segregation by sex, that the two mat-
ters are inextricably interwoven. Women are not only de-
prived of initial hiring opportunities and meaningful 
transfer and promotional opportunities, but are also paid 
lower wages on the jobs they are assigned precisely be-
cause those jobs are "women's" jobs.'0 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, I am gratified that Messrs. Nelson, Opton and 
Wilson undertook such a rigorous evaluation of my thesis. The 
wage discrimination issue, however, is more than a conflict over 
the legal theories of Title VII. As Owen C. Johnson remarked to 
personnel professionals at the October, 1980, meeting of the 
American Compensation Association: 
Wage discrimination is more than a legal theory. Societal 
pressure makes this an issue that you must deal with just 
as you deal with compression as · an issue, inflation or 
changing employee values. As a compensation profes-
sional, you will determine or help determine how work or 
values on this issue will or will not lead to societal 
change. The questions that you ask regarding sex segre-
gated job categories, your company's philosophy on com-
pensation and equity, your job evaluation thinking, all of 
these things will impact on how we shape our profession 
in the 1980's. So don't sit back and expect judicial deci-
sions to determine how you perform your job. I am not 
interested in a future where federal judges determine 
how my company will compensate our staff or how I'm 
compensated. Proactive action is required of the compen-
sation community.41 
•• Id. at 354. 
" Remarks of Owen C. Johnson, American Compensation Association Annual Meet-
ing, Chicago (October 2, 1980). Owen C. Johnson is Personnel Director of the Continen-
tal Grain Bank, Chicago, and Vice-Chairman of the Equal Employment Advisory 
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Mr. Johnson's statement suggests that employers recognize 
the problem of wage discrimination, and implies that some em-
ployers have already begun to take corrective action.42 In the po-
litical arena as well the nation is reaching a common under-
standing of the need. Two planks of the 1980 Republican 
Platform, for example, speak directly to this issue. The party 
position on wage discrimination in segregated jobs calls for "to-
tal integration of the work force (not separate but equal) to· 
bring ·women equality in pay," and states that "women's worth 
in the society and in the jobs they hold, at home or in the work-
place, must be reevaluated to improve the conditions of women 
workers concentrated in low-status, low-paying jobs."48 The 
Courts of Appeal have been resolving the Bennett Amendment 
problem; the Supreme Court will finish the clearing this year. 
The problem of wage discrimination needs to be faced squarely 
and objectively, for as EEOC Chair Eleanor Holmes Norton has 
noted, the question has captured the public imagination and is 
"likely to be one of the central legal and industrial relations 
issues of the 1980's."44 
Council. 
41 See also EEOC HEARINGS, supra note 9, at 53 (Testimony of David Thomsen and 
Bertram Gottlieb); Id. at 752 (Testimony of compensation and evaluation consultants); 
Id. at 679 (Testimony of Richard Henderson). 
0 1980 Republican Platform, reprinted in 38 CONG. Q. 2033 (1980). 
.. EEOC HEARINGS, supra note 9, at 4. 
